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Writing and teaching national history in Africa in an era 
of global history 
 
heir ambiguities notwithstanding, nation-states1 are still alive and they 
remain, for political leaders, the media and many analysts, the framework 
to understand political and economic realities. While the very notion of ‘na-
tion-state’ may be controversial, even contested,2 it remains the most common 
political mechanism to organize people into boundaries and governments, 
and history writing and teaching are partly formulated around it. For the 
powerful countries, the agenda of ‘global history’ is actually to retain their 
dominance, to build prestige around their location as the centers of the world, 
and to construct patriotism in such a way that their citizens see the advan-
tages of birth and membership in a nation, such that migrants can be attacked 
and expelled when necessary. It is the weak nations that are being asked to 
adjust, to subordinate their national histories to the threatening agenda of a 
global world and a global history. While strong powers protect their economic 
and political interests and prevent poor and struggling migrants from enter-
ing their borders, weak nations are being accused of reactionary and chauvin-
istic tendencies, fundamentalism, and excessive traditionalism.3 In this essay, 
                                                 
1 Nationalism, nationality, ethnicity, and other ambiguous terms have complicated the 
definition of the ‘nation state.’ In the context of this essay, nation-state refers to a sovereign 
‘state’ with a government presiding over a ‘country’ with boundaries recognized by other 
countries and international law. National history refers to studies on the ‘nation state’ and its 
component elements as in, for example, the history of South Africa, the history of the United 
States, or the history of Germany.  
2 Phil White, ‘The Future of the ‘Nation State’ ’, unpublished paper. Cited with permis-
sion. White advocates the abandonment of ‘nation state’ as a term on the basis of three rea-
sons: ‘First, its assumption that each of the world’s sovereign governments includes peoples 
of only one ethnic group does not accord with the reality that ethnic mixes exist in nearly all 
of them. Second, if widely implemented the idea would surely exacerbate international 
animosities. Third, by creating an enormous number of new governments focused on ethnic 
concerns it would worsen the already critical difficulty of securing international cooperation 
to address a host of world problems.’ He uses ‘nation state’ interchangeably with ethnicity 
and nationality, and calls for a nameless alternative, the ‘creation of civic or politi-
cal/territorial nationalities in which the government seeks to serve the interests of ALL 
people in its territory without regard to ethnicity.’  
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I would make a case for national histories, and close by recommending a syl-
labus as a guideline to those who want to keep a commitment to teaching 
them.  
 Global history is no more than a transitional narrative to globalization. 
Strong advocates of global history and globalization see the process of ex-
panding capitalism, postmodernism, and post-industrialism as inevitable. 
Global civilization, it is argued, will tear down the nation-state, reordering the 
nature of social institutions, production and accumulation.4 Almost without 
any apology, one scholar gives us this ‘preface’ to the new orientation of 
global history: 
 The 1990s is one of the great watershed decades in economic history. The 
postwar division of the world economy into the First, Second, and Third 
Worlds has ended. Not only has communism collapsed, but other ideologies 
of state-led development that were prevalent in the Third World for decades 
have fallen into disrepute. If the United States and the other industrial coun-
tries act with wisdom, they have a chance to consolidate a global capitalist 
world system, with profound benefits for both the rich and the poor coun-
tries.5  
 Global history may be triumphantly presented to weak nations as the 
end of national history, that is, the nation as the object of study. Global his-
tory, as a narrative of Western power and its expansion, provincializes his-
tory, turning the national history of one great power into the metanarrative of 
global history. National histories of Africa represent one of the powerful 
counters to the attempt to provincialize history. The very first task of writing 
and teaching national history in Africa is to understand the agenda of global 
history, the problems represented by the forces and pressures of globalization, 
and the wisdom to understand that when the United States and other indus-
trial countries ‘act with wisdom,’ it is not going to benefit rich and poor coun-
tries alike. World history has never seen such an ideology—intellectual, eco-
nomic or political—that benefits the rich and poor at the same time. African 
intellectuals are part of a ‘globalized world,’ as consumers of products and 
ideas. Their frameworks and universities benefit from national and global 
resources and ideas. The kind of connections we make, the preferences and 
                                                                                                               
3 To be sure, not all the teachers and texts of ‘world history’ preserve the Western narra-
tive, an approach which treats global history as Western civilization ‘plus’ a few other 
places, with Africa dismissed in a few pages. 
4 See, for instance, Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Inter-
linked Economy (New York: Harper Business, 1990); Jim Davis, ‘Rethinking Globalization,’ 
Race and Class, 40, 2/3, pp. 37-48; A. Sivanandan, ‘Globalism and the Left,’ Race and Class, 40, 
2/3, 1998, pp. 5-19; and Jerry Harris, ‘Globalization and the Technological Transformation of 
Capitalism,’ Race and Class, 40, October 1998, pp. 21-35. 
5  Jeffrey D. Sachs, ‘Consolidating Capitalism,’ Foreign Affairs, 98 (Spring), p. 50.  
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choices we establish between national and global history may compel us to 
answer some of the many questions posed to us by Arjun Appadurai regard-
ing our activism and pedagogy.6 In the quest to defend global history at the 
expense of the national, do we become agents of imperialism, the propagan-
dists of capitalism? We cannot regard global history as an alternative to na-
tional history, only as a pressure. And as a pressure on national history, we 
have to understand the ideologies and agenda of global history and globaliza-
tion in order to meaningfully pursue the interests and concerns of national 
history. In withstanding the pressure, the aim is not to reject theories, ideas, 
and epistemologies that may facilitate our understanding of African issues 
irrespective of where they come from. 
 Nationalism is not dead either. Indeed, so-called internationalism has 
not undermined the power of so-called nationalism or even fundamentalism. 
The agenda imposed by a superpower is no more important than the one 
demanded by weak nation-states in the international arena. Global history, if 
its motive is to create a center for the world, will only awaken nationalism 
that will make national history writing and research important to the so-
called periphery. Africa had previously witnessed the attempt to impose a 
global (European-centered) history on its people, as part of the colonial pro-
ject of imposing Western civilization on so-called primitive people. The ‘colo-
nial library’ that emerged ultimately failed, not because its creators were no 
longer alive to keep it going but because African nationalism was powerful 
enough to create alternative histories. Indeed, nationalism and the defense of 
national history and its identity has given me this conclusion to present: the 
study of the nationalist movements as well as the writings by nationalist lead-
ers, in their non-elitist forms, remain the essential (and one can argue, time-
less) aspects of African history. Whether it is Jomo Kenyatta and his cultural-
ist-oriented writings, or Amilcar Cabral and the socialist orientation, or 
Kwame Nkrumah the Pan-Africanist, or Nelson Mandela and the anti-
apartheid intellectuals, or a crowd of North African nationalists drawing on 
Islam (e.g., Anwar Sadat of Egypt), all the issues they raised define what Afri-
cans will continue to live and struggle with in today’s global era. Simply put, 
the core of the issues revolve around Africa’s engagement with its indigenous 
past, with Western/Christian traditions, and with Arab/Islamic ones; in sum, 
with modernity.7 Global history is ultimately linked to globalization; national 
                                                 
 
6 Arjun Appadurai, ‘Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination,’ in Arjun 
Appadurai, ed., Globalization (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 1-21. 
7 J. Ayo Langley, Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856-1970: Documents On Modern 
Political Thought From Colonial Times to the Present (London: Rex Collins, 1979); Molefi Kete 
Asante and Abu S. Abarry, eds., African Intellectual Heritage: A Book of Sources (Philadelphia: 
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history will respond by creating identities and nationalism to protect local 
interests and prevent the erasure of multiple (even different) voices.  
 If a valuable lesson is to be learned from the writings of these political 
pioneers, as well as intellectual leaders such as Wilmot Blyden, Anta Diop 
and K. O. Dike, it is that there is no need to apologize for writing about na-
tional history in a particular way or manner. The goal of national history, as 
these pioneers saw it, was not to produce works to be consumed by outsiders 
or to seek global acceptability, but to see the nation and its people as the ‘con-
text’ of study, and to give agency to Africans who had been denied a history. 
Procedures and universalist rules of writings were not necessarily questioned 
or ignored, but they wanted to write and teach in a way that history was con-
nected with the concerns of the nation. Indeed, they accepted the notion of 
difference: that African history could be different in many ways from other 
histories or from how historians in other places defined and wrote African 
history. The pioneers faced the problems of ‘global history’ and imperialism, 
just as we face them today. They wanted to create the ‘nation,’ but we also 
face today the crisis of the nation-state in a global world. Africans have to 
cope with the crisis of the state, the burden of inherited Western legacies, and 
the turmoil of globalization. We are not as far removed from the pioneers as 
we would like to think. Like the pioneers, we cannot relegate national history 
to the backwaters, and ask African students to know more about the United 
States or Europe than Africa. Some kinds of global history have a tendency to 
belittle African national histories, to undermine the significance of national 
identities, and even to pretend that other forms of identity within a nation 
constitute an obstacle to the spread of Western values. National history, when 
it becomes a mere appendage of global history defined in an imperialistic 
manner, becomes a tool to consolidate Western hegemony and imperialism.  
 History, like all forms of knowledge, is obviously not neutral. African 
historians are being asked to make hard choices, to balance the defense of 
Africa (and their countries) with those of global forces and history. If they 
defend Africa to an extreme, they become ‘nativists’ who lack a sense of pro-
portion; if they extol global history to an extreme, they become ‘xenophobic.’8 
Ideological options may be inevitable, but a starting point is to invest national 
history with its own dignity, and to deal with its contradictions without turn-
ing knowledge into an instrument of state repression. 
 
                                                                                                               
Temple University Press, 1996); and Toyin Falola, Nationalism and African Intellectuals (Roch-
ester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2001). 
8 The criticisms of these attitude can be found in Thandika Mkandawire, ‘Globalization 
and Africa’s Unfinished Agenda,’ Macalaster International, 7, pp. 71-107; and Ann Cvetkovich 
and Douglas Kellner, eds., Articulating the Global and the Local (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1997). 
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The past in the present 
 
Before anyone can complain about my having to run to the past to seek an-
swers to the issues of the present, let me quickly say that Africa is not new to 
this global experience, to the vigorous attempts to erase the experiences of so-
called local identities, sweeping the dust of the ethnic under the carpet of the 
national, and the national itself under the table of the universal. What was the 
slave trade if not a global trade, with Africa as part of the triangle in an evil 
commerce? Africans were exchanged for goods, notably objects of leisure and 
violence. We have a major topic already defined for us. Global history cannot 
marginalize the place of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the African dias-
pora, which have to be studied on their own right and in comparisons with 
other diasporas, forced or voluntary. Compared to other diasporas and global 
migrations, for instance of Europeans to the New World, the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade still remains the least studied, not to mention our weak knowledge 
of the Indian diaspora to Africa, Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. 
 Globalization is not new. The slave trade is but one of many of its 
manifestations. And as the trans-Atlantic slave trade shows, globalization is 
not limited to the traffic in goods, but also in ideas. The idea of racism circu-
lated more widely in the Western world, with Africans regarded and treated 
as the most inferior of all races. The ideas have taken firm root, and national 
history in the era of global history must confront it. Modern globalization 
tends to disguise the idea of race in the notion of cultural inferiority, 
marketing so-called universalist cultures and values as superior to indigenous 
ones. The World might have changed since the nineteenth century, but the 
perceptions of Africa remain. 
  ‘We believe that the Negro people as a race,’ wrote Du Bois in 1897 as 
the first article of the racial creed that he proposed in The Conservation of Races, 
‘have a contribution to make to civilization and humanity which no other race 
can make.’ This was a confident statement made against the background of 
racism in the late nineteenth century. But over a hundred years later, even if 
the tone and tenor have changed, Africans are being challenged to justify their 
humanity and existence. History cannot survive without responding to the 
challenge. Du Bois and others pioneered an approach which academic schol-
ars popularized after the Second World War: nationalist historiographies. The 
idea then, one which should not be abandoned even now, is to interpret the 
achievements of the past. Without this approach, knowledge about the great 
kingdoms, the vibrant political institutions, and the enduring economies 
would never have been known. If the ‘colonial library’ wanted to suppress the 
knowledge about Zimbabwe, nationalist historiography rescued it. 
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Nationalist historiography links Africa’s present to its past, the past existing 
in the memory of the present, as the present lays the foundation for the fu-
ture. National history, in the conception of nationalist historiography, be-
comes a sort of ‘political charter’ linking history with the nation, the nation 
with nationalism. We cannot forget that the ‘nationalist historians’ were 
themselves the creation of nationalist movements. In defining themselves and 
their careers, national history was paramount: they would decolonize history 
and decolonize the minds of their students. If politicians were afraid of his-
tory, for fear that it could promote the politics of ethnicity, nationalist histori-
ans wanted to use history in the service of nationalism, according pride to 
their people, demonstrating their rich heritage, showing that they once had 
capable leaders who managed complex societies, and that their people had 
the skills and talents to create better postcolonial nations. While the national-
ist historians were elite who lived in two worlds—the modernizing/Western 
and the indigenous/local—they were not always able to resolve the tensions 
of the culture divide. However, what they clearly understood was the need to 
build strong national histories, even if the components of change would be 
Western, as in the creation of schools, hospitals, factories, or even of their own 
jobs with the privileges enjoyed by colonial officers. In the words of Professor 
J. F. Ade Ajayi, one of the pioneers: 
 When foreign learning began to be grounded on oral culture, it became 
enriched, energized and creative. That was the secret of Ibadan’s innovations 
not only in African Studies, History, Psychiatry, etc. but in the ethos of the 
whole university as an institution of higher education. It was also the secret of 
the literary success of such giants as Soyinka and Achebe, brought up on 
European literature but decided to be creative and tell Africa’s story in their 
own way, even in the medium of English.9 
 This ‘secret’ should become open enough to guide the mission of na-
tional history in the age of global history: traditions, localism, communities, 
and ruralism. Indigenous knowledge should inform what we do against the 
background of external ideas and ‘universal’ methodologies and approaches. 
For example, even to those who regard nationalist historiography as elitist or 
obsolete, the stress on ‘oral culture’ remains valid. 
 The writing and research on national history reflects the conflicted 
minds of the intellectuals: should they stress aspects of globalization and 
                                                 
 
9 Toyin Falola, ed., Tradition and Change in Africa: The Essays of J. F. Ade Ajayi (Trenton, NJ: 
Africa World Press, 2000), p. 401. On the works embodying the ideas of nationalist historiog-
raphy, see also Toyin Falola, ed., The Challenges of History and  Leadership in Africa: The Essays 
of Bethwell Allan Ogot (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 2002); and Toyin Falola, ed., Africa 
in the Twentieth Century: The Adu Boahen Reader (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, forthcom-
ing). 
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modernization? Should they defend the ethnic origins and the aspirations of 
their local constituencies? As elite, have they become removed from the real-
ity on the ground, using the privileges of Western education to distance them-
selves from the masses? National history, like the nation itself, was in the 
process of formation. Colonially created countries are artificial, and history 
writing and teaching is trying to ‘homogenize’ disparate identities. National 
consciousness is in the process of formation, and the tensions are captured in 
various writings. Even then, the promotion of national consciousness, sup-
ported by nationalist historiography, has not stopped the rise of ethnic fun-
damentalism and struggles leading to wars in many countries. In the case of 
Nigeria, many defenders of the nation in the 1950s supported secession in the 
1960s. And in spite of the commitment of many to the idea of Nigerian na-
tional history, none of the pioneers was able to write a definitive single-
volume history of the country. 
 Whose history? And whose nation? Become two of the questions that 
have complicated nationalist historiographies as they address national history 
with an excessive focus on kings, queens, merchants and states. Both will 
continue to face us even today, as we factor into national history the forces of 
class, ethnicity and culture. As professors struggle for power within and out-
side the universities, they, like the politicians, give politics a primacy that may 
fragment the very nation they seek to protect. National and ‘tribal’ histories 
can become the handmaidens of politics for an elite in search of wealth and 
power. What nationalist history in Africa has carried too far is not the kind of 
nationalism that produced racism or ethnocentrism in the West. Indeed, one 
could argue that most African countries have yet to even generate consensus 
on national histories that could build the platform for patriotism or racism. It 
is also clear that they have yet to succeed in using history to create national 
pride. As my students at the University of Ife in Nigeria asked me: ‘Why 
should we care about the Oyo empire if our future is bleak?’  On the contrary, 
nationalist historiography is propelled by nationalism rather than the docu-
mentation and theorization of nationalism as an ideology. And when inde-
pendence was attained, as the case of Nigeria shows, many scholars aban-
doned national history (and its advocacy) in preference for ‘ethnic histories.’ 
Many also drew from various perspectives of the day (modernization, de-
pendency, and Marxism) to offer various devastating critiques of the state. 
The extreme critique of the nation, rather than its defense, became a passion. 
A critic is not the enemy of the nation or of national history, even if political 
dictators think otherwise. 
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The imperatives of development 
 
In the search for relevance, history writing and teaching are gradually being 
forced to demonstrate their ‘practical-ness.’ Without showing how it is con-
nected to development, history becomes criticized as one of the most irrele-
vant disciplines in the humanities. Even students ask their teachers what they 
are supposed to do with the degrees and the relevance of the topics they teach 
them. Globalization and global history cannot but make the demand for rele-
vance more aggressive, more salient. African countries are now being forced 
to deal with globalization, not necessarily on their own terms. Elements of 
imperialism are at work, without gun boat diplomacy or the use of Gatling 
and Maxim guns. The relations among states are more intense, the scope more 
broad. Market and popular cultures spread rapidly, threatening and displac-
ing traditional, aristocratic and Islamic cultures. 
 As values spread, mainly from the West to Africa, in ways reminiscent of 
the colonial era, many people begin to talk of the end of the boundaries of 
nations. Globalization is in part about the interactions of nations and the 
changes that come with them.10 History writing and teaching must pay atten-
tion to its impact on Africa, and confront its negative aspects just as cultural 
nationalists did in the first half of the twentieth century. If globalization in-
tends to narrow the distance between nations, we are at a loss in understand-
ing what roles Africa is allowed to take and how these are different from the 
exploitative colonial arrangement. No one is denying that Africa needs all the 
gains of modernity, but historians must measure the cost. For instance, what 
is the impact of migration and the brain drain on the overall development of 
the continent? Is African labor not being exploited? It is clear that the various 
uses to which labor has been put is not always positive to Africa’s needs.11 
 Globalization, like imperialism, supports a development ideology. The 
orthodoxy which emerged from colonialism is that of ‘free enterprise’; that of 
globalization is the same. The thread is exploitative capitalism. This is a sub-
ject for us. When Africa’s contact deepened with the West during the colonial 
phase, so too did the economy become organized around exportable items. 
Globalization has enhanced communication flows, and information technolo-
gies have become so widespread that one can now use a cell phone from a 
remote village in Nigeria to speak with someone in New York. Physical 
boundaries are not disappearing, but the distances in space appear to shrink 
with the use of the telephone, fax and computers. In its public face, globaliza-
                                                 
10 See, for instance, K Griffin and K. Khan, Globalization in the Developing World: An Essay on 
the International Dimension of Development in the Post-Cold War Era (Geneva: UNRISD, 1992).  
11 See, for instance, J. Mittleman, ‘Rethinking the International Division of Labour in the 
Context of Globalisation’ Third World Quarterly , 16, 2, 1995. 
Writing and teaching national history in Africa 
 
507
tion sells itself as capitalism; in its hidden face, it may be nothing more than 
imperialism. One of our goals should be to evaluate the impact of develop-
mental ideologies on national history. Neoliberalism calls on African coun-
tries to see the ‘market’ as the center of economy, with one suggestion to pri-
vatize and transfer land from thousands of peasants to a handful of investors. 
Historians will be the first to show the failure of centralized state economies, 
of previous agendas of socialism and economic nationalism. But we also have 
data to expose the limitations of neoliberalism, the dangers of reducing peas-
ants to economic agents with little political franchise. Capitalism wants to 
empower the market by expropriating the principal agents of production, 
and, at the same time, hopes that there will be peace and order in the land. 
 The ideology and orthodoxy of development will inevitably force us to 
pose serious questions on the impact of the West on Africa, similar to the 
inconclusive debates on the agency of colonialism in Africa. Just as the colo-
nial officers regarded colonialism as the positive agency of change, advocates 
of globalization use similar words to paint a rosy picture for Africa if it em-
beds itself in a global world. How far more should it be embedded, having 
been incorporated into the world economy since the fifteenth century? To the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Africa should seek greater 
incorporation. The failed Structural Adjustment Programs are nothing but 
part of this incorporationist ideology, with the World Bank arguing that the 
end results will bring massive upliftment to the majority of the African popu-
lation.12  Many of the gains of a globalized world have been mentioned, in 
part to keep attracting Africa to it: greater flows of goods and ideas, an inte-
grated financial world, and better trade. The World Trade Organization, in 
spite of many wide-scale demonstrations against it, continues to sell the idea 
of a unified world, even in the face of rising poverty in Africa.  
 Although not always in the Marxist tradition of the 1950s and 1960s, 
scholars of the radical persuasion see little but misery in globalization, as they 
argue that Africa will see woes, inequities, domination, marginalization, and 
underdevelopment.13  Global history, presented in the image of Structural 
                                                 
12 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and Developing Countries (Washington DC: World 
Bank, 1996). 
13 S. Zeltzer, ‘Global Victory in Seattle: Workers, Students, Activists Defeat World Trade 
Organization,’ Revolutionary Democracy , 6, 1, April 2000; J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, ‘Mil-
lennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming’ Public Culture, 12, 2, 2000; D. Ghai, 
Structural Adjustment, Global Integration and Social Democracy (Geneva: UNRISD Discus-
sion Paper, 1992); J. Mittelman, ‘The Globalization Challenge: Surviving at the Mar-
gins,’Third World Quarterly , 15, 3, 1994; A. Roy, ‘Imperialist Globalization and Labor,’ Revolu-
tionary Democracy , 3, 2, September 1997. For more radical critique of globalization, see, 
among others, Claude Ake, ‘The New World Order: A View from Africa,’ in H. Hans-
Henrick and G. Sørenson, eds., Whose World Order: Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold 
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Adjustment Programs, becomes in part a discussion of the expansion of eco-
nomic liberalization and privatization, in ways similar to the expansion of the 
West in the late nineteenth century. The metaphors and imageries of Western 
expansion sound familiar: in the nineteenth century, it was against the back-
ground of a so-called Dark Continent; in the post-SAP era, of a repressive, 
backward continent. If the idea of ‘progress’ dominated discourse in the colo-
nial era, the themes of post-SAP Africa revolve around democracy, good gov-
ernance, human rights, and human dignity. To be sure, all these topics are 
important, but one of the tasks of national history is to deconstruct them, 
domesticating terminologies and applying them within specific contexts and 
historical milieu. 
 Neoliberalism is powerful, more so as it is being sponsored by external 
powerful forces in Africa in a way that is not just reshaping the economy but 
also intellectual ideologies. A number of practical issues also enter the acad-
emy to shape historical knowledge. As Non-Governmental Organizations 
grow in numbers and power to express opposition, so too have contemporary 
national histories grown to include topics on civil society. We are being forced 
to evaluate the role of Africa and its component states in a global system. 
 Africa lacks the power to curb the excesses of capitalism, and its so-
called ‘economic liberty’ that may affect the continent in a less than-
compassionate manner. Those who live by the market may die by the market. 
The responsibility of historians may be to explore the ways to prevent Africa 
from dying with the market as defined and imposed by globalization and 
imperialist domination. Many of our predecessors have devoted time and 
energy to seeking answers that we can continue to learn from and improve 
upon. The globalizing tendencies of colonialism generated dissent; so too is 
contemporary globalization creating its own critics all over the world.14 While 
some see the global trends as novel and distinct, there are those who regard it 
as a phase that will soon pass.15 Global history can capture the contradictions 
and dysfunctionality in the world system, talking about consensus and con-
tests. The elements of fad and fashion in global history should not blind us 
into seeing the reality that faces Africa. 
                                                                                                               
War (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1995), pp. 19-42; and Samir Amin, Capitalism in the Age of 
Globalization (London: Zed, 1997). 
14 See, for instance, P. Cerny, ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Politi-
cal Globalisation,’ Government and Opposition, 32, 2, 1997. 
15 Compare and contrasts the works by D. Held, notably Democracy and the Global Order: 
From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); D. Held and J. 
Hazel, Dispelling the Myth of Globalization: The Case for Regionalism  (New York: Praeger, 1992); 
D. Held, A. McGrew, and D. Goldblatt, and J. Perraton, eds., Global Transformations: Politics, 
Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity, 1999). 
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Specifics and suggestions16 
 
Some have denied the possibility of national history in an era of globalization 
and global history. Some others think that writing about national history in 
the era of globalization should be characterized as a paradox. To acknowledge 
the existence of globalization, as some believe, is to grow beyond the bounda-
ries and limitations of national history into a trans-national approach.17 Na-
tionalist frameworks are regarded as either weak or untenable in the face of 
‘transnational formation,’ to use the phrase by Paul Gilroy.18 My own re-
sponse is to pose just one question: where will the African voice be located? 
We have seen how a number of so-called global histories erase African voices. 
National histories may not be able to escape from the context of globalization, 
as nations deal with the impact of received ideas. To cite some cultural studies 
as examples, David Coplan’s study on South African music, Cole on concert 
party, and Savishinsky on reggae in West Africa19 outline how ideas from 
other parts of the world travel to Africa to popularize musical genres and 
shape popular cultures. Even in the spread of ideas, we see globalization at 
work, but we also see local creativity, intelligent adaptations and great talents 
that all validate the power of national history.  
I am aware that not all national histories can be clearly defined. Even if it 
could be defined, national history can generate a consensus only for a limited 
time in history, as in the case of Africa during the years of decolonization. 
Without an hegemonic elite in power, it is always difficult to construct a con-
sensus. The lack of a consensus does not mean that there is no national his-
tory, only that it is a contested one. I am also aware that generalizations that 
                                                 
16 I have, more or less, treated writing and teaching history as facing similar challenges, 
although I have made some comments about the attitudes of students and provide a long 
section on the syllabus.  Another distinction that can be made is the evolving role or possi-
bilities for history at an undergraduate survey level vs. at the graduate research level. My 
suggestions reflect ideas drawn from various continents, deriving from my own personal 
experience of growing up in Nigeria and now working in the United States. 
17 For some current debates, see Mike Featherstone, ed., Global Culture: Nationalism, Global-
ization, and Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1990); Homi Bhabha, ed.,  Nation and 
Narration (London and New York: Routledge, 1990) and Arif Dirlik, Vinay Bahl, and Peter 
Gran, eds., History after The Three Worlds: Post-Eurocentric Historiographies  (Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). 
18 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), ix. 
19 David Coplan, In Township Tonight!: South Africa’s Black City Music and Theatre (London: 
Longman, 1985); Catherine M. Cole, Ghana’s Concert Party Theatre (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2001); and Neil J. Savishinksy, ‘Rastafari in the Promised Land: The Spread 
of Jamaican Socioreligious Movement Among the Youth of West Africa,’ African Studies 
Review, 37, 3, 1994, pp. 19-50.  
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apply to all African countries may carry some risks, as countries do differ of 
course from one another. Nigeria and South Africa are not the same, even if 
they have to deal with a number of common problems such as the eradication 
of poverty and bridging the gap between the poor and the rich. Yoruba eth-
nicity and identity are not necessarily the same as those of the Zulu, and the 
consequences they produce may also differ.  The differences underscore the 
importance of national history, providing historians with the opportunity to 
consider contexts and specific histories as they relate to various localities and 
countries. 
 The dangers of global history to Africa are clear to see. Implicit in the 
idea is that of a unified world, or what some call a uni-polar world. Global 
history has been presented as the rise of Western civilization, and now as the 
hegemony of the United States. Africa becomes the distant province in the 
construction of the center of a uni-polar world. National histories cannot see 
their nations and peoples as mere provincial elements and second-class citi-
zens. Rather, Africa has to be the very center of history while others, in spite 
of their dominance, are put at the margins. When Europeans tried this in the 
colonial era, consigning Africa to the irrelevant margins of history, African 
nationalist historians put Africa at the center, exploring the power of resis-
tance and nationalism. As we follow in the impressive footpaths of the pio-
neers, our own challenge is to use the challenges offered by economic devel-
opment and political instability to combat the perils of global history. The 
current uni-polar world should be treated in the same way that nationalist 
politicians and historians treated the colonial world order: to be resisted for 
its imperialistic combativeness. Global history, in its orthodoxy of liberaliza-
tion, may not be totally different from the totalitarian ideologies of colonial-
ism. It is the very orthodoxy of liberalization that may produce insurgent 
scholars who see the need to defend the nation and its history. 
 We must not only insist on the insertion of African voices, but we must 
empower national history such that historians are able to contribute to the 
gargantuan project of nation building. I have indicated the relative timeless-
ness of the writings of independence leaders such as Leopold Senghor, Amil-
car Cabral, Nelson Mandela, Kwame Nkrumah and others, as well as those 
leaders involved in the non-aligned movement. Practical and intellectual ef-
forts to find paths between capitalism and communism continue to have 
resonances with the current era in dealing with Africa's "triple heritage": in-
digenous, Arab/Muslim, European/Christian. These political and intellectual 
leaders saw in national history an agency of liberation, of decolonization: 
history became an ‘ideology’ to remake the nation. 
 While one sleeps, global economy and culture are at work. Not only do 
we have to analyze how globalization works, but also its outcome on states 
and societies in Africa. During the nineteenth century and for most of the 
colonial era, African scholars and educated elite wondered about the impact 
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of the European encounter on African cultures. Today, we have to address 
issues around culture and capitalism, the extent to which they impact national 
histories. The fear is that a unified culture will marginalize Africa, rather than 
empower it, turning its citizens into consumers of imported items. Imported 
goods and ideas will merge to give supremacy to capitalism and a political 
order defined largely in Western terms. African cultures that fail to succumb 
become condemned as obstacles in the way of constructing a grand narrative 
of global history. 
 We cannot escape the challenges posed by nation building. Responses to 
global history constitute part of this challenge, as well as the established in-
terests in understanding sources of national division, ethnicity, political insta-
bility and other problems. Our predecessors wanted to use history to build 
pride because their peoples and institutions were condemned by Europeans. 
They deconstructed the colonial library. The present mission is to engage the 
postcolonial situations and empower the nations with the knowledge to trans-
form them. Our predecessors wanted to demonstrate that they could over-
come the limitations of the artificial nations created for them by colonial pow-
ers (they wrote on precolonial groups and nations to show relations and con-
tacts), we have to show that we can work with and overcome the limitations 
imposed by globalization, as we use the understanding of the present to write 
about the past. Our predecessors, imbued with nationalism, sought an end to 
colonial domination, we have to extend their agenda into the task of complet-
ing the quest for autonomy, decolonization, and development. As our prede-
cessors sought to empower national history, they did so with a recognition of 
the crucial role of continentalism; we have to continue with the goal in locat-
ing national history within regional and continental histories, seeking the 
means to forge collective development, regional unity, and the strengthening 
of Africa in world politics. 
 Either to benefit from the products and processes of globalization or to 
resist the fragmentation of their societies and cultures, national history will 
still be dominated by resistance. Peoples and organizations will pressure their 
countries and governments to do more for them, as they seek access to mod-
ern goods and travel abroad for opportunities. We have to understand resis-
tance and violence as they shape contemporary realities and define the no-
tions of power and democracy. The pressure for democracy may actually 
promote religious and ethnic fundamentalism, as political actors use religion 
and ethnicity to organize to gain power or to resist local and global powers. 
Human rights, freedom, and democracy will all be linked in resistance and 
violence. The activities of Non-Governmental Organizations continue to mul-
tiply and to affect new areas dealing with the environment, prison reforms, 
changes to land tenure systems, and demands for the rights of children and 
women. NGOs may be responding to global politics, but as they do, the pres-
sure on the nations is greater than on external powers. Research and teaching 
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national history have to deal with the frontiers of resistance and violence, 
symbolized by the activities of NGOs, youth movements, para-military and 
ethnic organizations, and religious fundamentalism. 
 African intellectuals, as researchers and teachers, are not always objec-
tive actors in the analysis of national and global histories. Their colleagues 
elsewhere have been implicated in the rise of totalitarian regimes, fascism, 
genocide, apartheid, and Eurocentricism, to mention some obvious ones. A 
good number of Western intellectuals are part of the marketing of imperial-
ism and capitalism, disguised as global history, to Africa. If globalization 
worships the market, African scholars may have to turn to the gods of nation-
alism and development to write on national history.  
 As scholars pursue research on national history, they are bound to con-
front other forms of pressure: local histories, especially where locality is also 
the basis of forming political units; and ethnic histories, significant in almost 
all plural societies. Universities are sometimes the creation of ethnic forces, 
with scholars championing the causes of particular ethnic groups, even using 
scholarship to promote ethnic interests in ways that may undermine the na-
tional. There are also the demands of regional histories, as each country is also 
part of a region that may seek to unite and benefit from greater interactions. 
And the pursuit of pan-African aspirations also have to be factored into the 
presentation of national history. What all these competing forces suggest is 
that national history is an ongoing dynamic construction with competing 
agendas and pressures. A unified structure is not always easy to accomplish, 
as the work of Benedict Anderson suggests.20  
 
Curriculum  
 
As I said at the beginning, I want to provide a set of guidelines on how the 
suggestions above can be transferred to the classrooms. If I were to be pinned 
down to be more specific, to offer a sort of a ‘syllabus’ for classroom use, I 
would provide the following as a list. We have to keep decolonizing African 
historiography, to turn to indigenous creativity and ideas, to empower the 
marginalized voices, to shed light on the tremendous energy and success 
represented by popular cultures, market women, craft workers, and local 
cultivators, among others. Oral history should not be abandoned in the face of 
global history. Students and researchers must contribute to our understand-
ing of a variety of topics: migration flows within Africa and nation-states; 
regional conflicts; ethnic and religious divisions; inter- and intra-national 
                                                 
 
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nation-
alism (New York: Verso, 1983; revised ed., 1991). 
Writing and teaching national history in Africa 
 
513
relations within Africa; development and modernization; processes of democ-
ratization and participatory practices; neoliberal reforms; cultural transforma-
tions; market and economic networks; the Cold War and its aftermath; eco-
logical history and sustainable development; and mass communication. All 
these topics can be framed as ‘national history.’ National history—rather than 
global history—can be the center of the curriculum, with the goal of under-
standing a country’s experience within a regional and continental framework 
and with other courses to compare and contrast experiences in a global world. 
National history does not mean that African or regional histories are ignored, 
or that global experiences are abandoned. Neither should national history 
ignore broad historical concepts and theories to understand big issues and 
transnational ideas, lest it become merely descriptive. National history must 
understand global forces. When students are exposed to global history, the 
terms may be explicit: to increase their knowledge of global events and their 
implications on their countries and the continent; to foster global conscious-
ness but without losing freedom and autonomy; and to understand relation-
ships between and among peoples.21   
 In connecting national history to ‘global history,’ we have to study the 
relative power of each country (and the continent) in relation to other conti-
nents, in particular the degree of autonomy they enjoy with regard to political 
and economic decisions. The point about autonomy is important if one of the 
transformations caused by globalization is to marginalize weak states. Issues 
around economic development are still the primary concerns in Africa. Thus, 
we have to remain interested in national financial institutions and the extent 
to which pressures are mounted on them by multinational companies, the 
World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF. Furthermore, it is 
crucial to understand the impact of the spread of trans-national production 
and the use of African labor. International politics and national politics re-
main connected and important. We cannot fail to understand the role of 
global financial houses, the extent to which agencies of globalization (such as 
the WTO) also serve as the agencies of imperialism. New information tech-
                                                 
21 Space does not permit an elaboration of the various perspectives and texts on ‘World 
History.’ There are those who use World History as an academic tool to project Western 
dominance. A common example of the preservation of Western narrative are texts on West-
ern Civilizations, with a few pages devoted to the conquest of Africa. See, for instance, Robin 
W. Winks, Crane Brinton, John B. Christopher and Robert Lee Wolffe,  A History of Western 
Civilizations, Vol. 1, Prehistory to 1715 (   Prentice Hall, 9th ed., 1995); and Vol. 2, 1614 to the 
Present (Prentice Hall, 9th ed., 1995). Alternatives ideas and approaches exist, with some 
focusing on themes and comparative ideas, drawing case studies from different parts of the 
world. On this approach, see, for instance, Jerry H. Bentley and Herbert F. Zeigler, Traditions 
and Encounters: A Global Perspectives on the Past  (McGraw Hill, 1999). 
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nologies stand to benefit Africa, and the potential to build archives, using 
resources drawn from various sources and countries, as well as the possibility 
to broaden knowledge and scholarship are all important. New technologies 
will assist us to access and present data in more creative ways, but Africa 
cannot just be on the receiving end of knowledge production. Ideas have to 
circulate in a global world, such that all countries can benefit. Historians must 
contribute to the study of wealth transfer. Goods and services now travel 
faster, thanks to improved communication and information networks. We 
should teach and research international flows of goods and services, not just 
to accumulate knowledge but to prepare the minds of students for greater 
understanding of international political economy. The various topics and 
issues connect national history to regional and continental histories, as well as 
to global history without losing focus, without pushing national history to an 
insignificant margin. 
  Still on specificity, and to address the concerns of those who demand 
chronologies while not ignoring themes, the topics above (as well as others) 
can be divided into four broad areas: 
 
1. Historical foundations in the context of ‘pre-colonial histories’; the various 
internal transformations; international networks such as the Atlantic complex; 
origins of underdevelopment, etc. The issues will enable us to consider vari-
ous concepts to understand Africa and locate it in a global context. Steven 
Feierman has suggested some ways that Africa can be studied in ways differ-
ent from the ‘West.’22 
 
2. Colonialism in the context of state/society relations; social relations and 
class formation; Western education, world religions and elite formation; ex-
ploitation and political economy; formation of ethnicities; social change and 
social stratification; formal politics; formal economy and gender relations; etc. 
Contrasts are to be provided with precolonial formations in order to question 
the motives of the colonizers regarding change, race, civilization, and the 
constitution of knowledge. One agenda is to see the values of old that are 
recoverable in the pursuit of nation building and identity. Old kingdoms 
cannot be recreated, but the values of kingship may be relevant to the under-
standing of contemporary cultures of participatory government, rule of law, 
and accountability. Colonial rule established the foundation of contemporary 
Africa: the origins of the boundaries of modern countries; the sources of eth-
nicity and wars; the origins of autocratic power; the source of economic de-
                                                 
22 Steven Feierman (1999): ‘Colonizers, Scholars, and the Creation of Invisible Histories.’ In 
Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., Beyond the Cultural Turn. New Directions in the Study 
of Society and Culture (Berkeley / Los Angeles / London: University of California Press), 182-
216 
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pendence on external power and the creation of monocrop economies; the 
establishment of police and armies as instruments of coercion and state autoc-
racy; and the creation of a civil service that is prone to corruption. 
 
3. Decolonization and Nationalism: The emergence of the neocolonial state; 
modern state formation/structures of society; communal identities, ethnicity, 
and class formation; gender and generation. As the groundwork for the end 
of colonial rule was being laid, so too was that of inter-ethnic rivalries, con-
tests over boundaries, neocolonial exploitation, and new forms of nationalism 
and identities that overwhelm the colonially created nation-states. Inheriting 
colonial territories became much easier than building on them; the sover-
eignty that came with independence is weak; the state itself is malleable. De-
colonization was often achieved at the expense of cross-border ties, and the 
relationships between people forged on the basis of pan-Africanism gradually 
weakened. The dismantling of the colonial state presented national history 
with a host of new challenges: where is the nationalism to sustain the new 
nation? what nationalism does the new nation embody? who embodies the 
‘nationality’ of the nation that has no ‘father,’ ‘hero,’ mobilizational ideology, 
or popular political party? how should we characterize the postcolonial state? 
who has the legitimacy and credibility to govern and what are the sources? 
which elite (Islamic, traditional, Western educated) should control power and 
who should be defined as ‘national’? The renaming of the colonial state as 
postcolonial says very little in terms of development and stability. 
 
4. The Postcolonial State and Society: 
 
a. State disintegration and collapse—the process whereby states can no longer 
provide services and security; how can similar situations be prevented else-
where? Why are some states stable and others are not? Answers involve both 
the study of specific cases in detail, and comparative works of various coun-
tries (e.g., Sudan, Liberia, Congo vs Malawi, Ghana, Gambia). Trends, pat-
terns and warning signs of problems even in stable countries need to be stud-
ied/monitored. For instance, what is the future of Algeria and Nigeria against 
the background of their past history and present politics? To what extent can 
the political model of South Africa ensure stability and economic justice? 
Ethnic groups keep consolidating their identities in many countries, but it is 
clear that each ethnic group cannot constitute a political entity with the sover-
eignty of a ‘country.’ Similarly, there are inter-ethnic rivalries that create their 
own problems, usually less studied. Historians have to keep understanding 
the relationship between ethnicity and nationality and to join in the debates 
on the creation of a workable political nationality. Can Africa create a ‘civic 
identity’ in place of the ethnic? 
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b. Statism and neo-patrimonialism, and how they affect the rule of law, ac-
countability, autocracy, prebendalism and economic management. The nature 
of the patron-client system in a country is necessary to understand the behav-
ior and activities of members of the political class and warlords. Ethnic con-
flicts and democracy, although contradictory, remain two ongoing phenom-
ena. Statism has imposed two limits on the growth of the nation: the political 
system is constricted, as those in power use violence to curb opposition; and 
no mechanism is in place to placate political losers, or find avenues to incor-
porate them into power. 
 
c. The crisis of the modern African state, in terms of the institutions of gov-
ernance, leadership, popular cultures, and economic management. Why is the 
state, a project of development, either failed or not done well? Where citizens 
regard the state as ‘irrelevant,’ how do they organize access to schools, jobs, 
hospitals and other services? How can loyalty to a government be created? 
Citizens continue to seek the better management of state, especially as many 
lack jobs or opportunities for improvement. The resources available to sustain 
a system of political patronage continue to diminish, creating problems for 
those in power. If many countries are not free of external controls and are 
plagued by ethnic crises, to what extent are they ‘sovereign’ and ‘independ-
ent’?  
 
d. The crisis of economic production. Cases of economic stagnation are many, 
and rural areas and poor farmers have been devastated by failed policies and 
lack of development. Income inequality is a serious problem, and the gap 
between the rich and poor keeps widening. We have to sustain attention on 
economic history. As countries seek to maximize economic opportunities and 
develop technologies, governments and leading state officers may see a lim-
ited need for history. Indeed, some African governments see the teaching and 
writing of national history (or any history for that matter) as useless because 
they relate education strictly to jobs and development. History students, too, 
are caught in the trap, asking what their contributions to economic produc-
tion are. Thus, as we expose the crises of economic production, we also have 
to create a role for national history in the production of knowledge and skills. 
 
e. The rise of neoliberalism. We have to teach and research its various chal-
lenges to each country in particular and Africa in general. Students are bound 
to pose questions relating to its opportunities and threat. If degrees are sup-
posed to be relevant according to some kind of market value, History stu-
dents may seek the appreciation of their university diplomas along the nar-
row lines defined by neoliberalism. With the dominance of Western science 
and technology, popular culture and the market, young African students will 
continue to demand relevance. To what extent is capitalism working, and to 
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whose interest? By and large, capitalism has promoted the development of a 
parasitic cabal, closing the door to genuine investors who lack access to state 
power. 
 
f. The African state and the international system: a history of foreign relations; 
analysis of specific issues such as the African states and the Cold War; pan-
Africanism and the politics of African Unity; etc. As the world changes, and 
as the forces of globalization become stronger, Africa and its various countries 
are forced to adjust. But many cases of adjustments are not all that new—
national history has had to deal before with the marginal position of African 
countries in the world economy and politics. Historians have to capture the 
relations between countries. Without disparaging knowledge from other 
lands, we can engage in global history ‘from below’, focussing on the sup-
pressed history of resistance from sailors, slaves, market women, etc., and 
other forms of resistance that took place in the context of global traffic and 
therefore involved numerous cultural and political collaborations and bor-
rowings. I cannot deny the possibilities of ‘global history from below.’23  
 
g. The African state and international political economy. The role still as-
signed to Africa is to produce raw materials for Western countries, an eco-
nomic structure created by colonialism. Competitive advantages based on 
technology and the production and dissemination of knowledge exclude Af-
rica. Even the advantages derivable from agriculture continue to be weakened 
with Africa’s inability to control prices and quantities of supply, to stop West-
ern countries from offering protection and subsidy to their farmers, and offer-
ing food and textiles cheaper than those obtained from Africa. Such products 
as rice and used clothes dumped on Africa can undermine local production. 
 
h. The African state and the international system in the global era: post-
containment and the rise of globalism; multilateralism, bilateralism; national 
security; conflict resolution; democratization; democracy and finance capital; 
democracy and development; the limits of democracy; etc. Globalization is 
about the imposition of power and hegemonic order on various countries, the 
integration of African countries into world economies and power in ways that 
weaken them. Historians have to seek the ways to present national history in 
‘a world made up of fragments, of floating signs, of open texts, of flexible 
economies and ever moving meanings.’24 
                                                 
 
23 See, for instance, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: The 
Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Beacon Press, 2000).  
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i. The marginality of African states in the global era. Marginality does not 
mean that nations are not drawn into a global world, only that they lack 
power as members and that integration does not bring wealth but poverty. 
What gains accrue to these countries, and how can they minimize the flow of 
wealth to developed nations? What does the spread of ‘global cultures’ mean 
to various religious and ethnic identities?  
 
J. Migration and Diaspora as aspects of the impact of globalization. Do Afri-
can migrants play any crucial role as intermediaries for various neoliberal 
schemes? This is certainly true for migrants such as Indians in the United 
States. Is there any relation between the challenges of African national histo-
ries and diaspora studies that has been dominated by non-African scholars? 
 
k. New global themes in the twentieth-first century: internal and global eco-
nomic exploitation; demography: the resilience of African societies against the 
background of chaotic economies and politics; creativity and popular culture, 
in spite of political and economic constraints; migration and identities; cul-
tural alienation and cultural choices; class formation; gender relations; ethnici-
ties; religious fundamentalism; environment and ecology; science and tech-
nology; pan epidemics; communication and information; regionalism and 
cross-border economy and politics; etc. Historians have to remain interested 
in social movements, religious and ethnic identities, resistance and national-
ism, as these are the places to see how the people and their leaders respond to 
the challenges of development, power, initiatives for local autonomy, and 
responses to globalization and the messages from global history. The politics 
of survival (as a nation and people, and against state authoritarianism and the 
grip of global capitalism) will be the summary of teaching and writing about 
national history in Africa in the age of global history. 
                                                                                                               
24 Achile Mbebe, ‘Editorial,’ CODESRIA Bulletin, 3&4, 1998, p. 5. 
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Conclusion 
 
National history should not be interpreted as the history of the political class and 
the state it manages. The nation-state remains a powerful political idea, leaving us 
with little choice other than to analyze the role of the state. Since we are aware of 
the divisions in society, national history has to include the discussions of various 
loyalties and identities within a nation, the means to forge inter-group relations, 
the understanding of conflicts, relationships between tiers of government, and the 
kinds of state that may work for Africa.  
 In conclusion, while I have demonstrated the need for national histories, they 
are not by any means the only alternative to pursue. Neither is national history the 
only counter to global history. As I have mentioned above, continental and local 
histories are equally as important. Tension remains within global history itself, as 
in the competing paradigm of so-called Western against so-called Islamic worlds. 
Irrespective of the approach, the principal thing to bear in mind is the survival of 
African history in an ever changing world. 
 
